# Maintaining patient/transfusion safety during IT downtime

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# Synopsis

- What do we rely on our IT systems for
- IT related guidelines and requirements
- Leeds LIMS failure
  - What happened
  - How did we cope
  - Maintaining safety
- Summary





#### Leeds hospitals surgery postponed after IT problem

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Some hospital appointments and surgery at Leeds hospitals have had to be postponed because of "significant" problems with an IT system.



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#### Ransomware behind NHS Lanarkshire cyber-attack

③ 28 August 2017 Glasgow & West Scotland

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# What do we rely on our IT systems to do?

- Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS)
  - Maintaining patient records
    - Demographic details
    - Laboratory test details
    - Antibody records and special requirements
  - Maintaining stock records
  - Compatibility testing
    - Checking ABO / D compatibility
    - Electronic issue rules
  - Printing compatibility labels
  - Traceability



### Other systems

- Automated testing systems
- Blood Tracking
- Temperature monitoring
- Ordering
- Quality Management Systems



# Is there any guidance?

- BSH Guideline
  - Guidelines for the specification, implementation and management of information technology systems in hospital transfusion laboratories. Dec 2014
- UKAS: ISO 15189
- BSQR Requirements
  - Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005 (SI 50/2005)
- MHRA Requirements / Guidance
  - Eudralex
  - Blood compliance report



#### **BSH IT Guidelines**

- System availability and business continuity
  - Appropriate fall back and support arrangements...
  - …Ensure continued service delivery in the absence of the IT system…
  - Risk assessments associated with system failure used to inform system design, implementation and backup and recovery procedures...

#### ▶ ISO 15189(2012)

 The laboratory shall have documented contingency plans to maintain services in event of failures or downtime in information systems that affects the laboratory's ability to provide service.



# When disaster strikes, what is the plan?





# When LIMS fails; this is the plan

- Suspend routine testing
- Test urgent requests only
- Use a manual recording system
- Suspend Electronic Issue; serological crossmatch all red cells
- When IT is running again, catch up



# How long will this plan work?

- Few hours? Yes
- > 24 hours? Yes
- 48 hours? Just about
- 1 week? No
- 2 weeks? No!
- 6 weeks? Definitely not!





#### So what happened at Leeds?







# Pathology IT system

LIMS at Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust

- iLab TP (Telepath)
- Current hardware ~6 years old
- System been in place ~30-35 years
- Friday 16<sup>th</sup> Sept 2016 12:30pm
  - Telepath crashed for all Pathology departments across all sites



# What had gone wrong?

- Multiple drives had failed
- CSC worked all weekend to fit new hard drives
- Tried to restore system and databases from back-ups
  - Back-ups not complete not possible to restore system!
  - Complete rebuild required
  - May take up to 6 weeks!

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Haematology and Transfusion







#### New recovery plan





#### Return to manual system

- Does everyone really know how to do this?
- Where and how do you record things?
- How do you deal with special requirements?
- What about transfusion history?
- Who's got an antibody?
- Where are all the staff we need?



# Early conclusion

- We cannot provide a normal transfusion service safely
- Involve Trust's Senior Management Team and Clinical Teams
  - Routine surgery deferred (147 procedures postponed)
  - Daily clinical meetings to decide on surgical cases



### Testing

- All patients assumed to be recently transfused
  - All samples are only valid for 72 hours

#### Tested

- Requests for components
- Urgent 'high risk' group and save samples
- Cords and Kleihauers
- Given laboratory accession numbers as normal
- Used automated grouping systems manual transcription or printing of results



- Untested samples
  - Given lab accession number
  - If remained unused discarded after 72 hours
- In both cases forms stored in alphabetical order, samples in numerical order





# **Compatibility testing**

- All red cells IAT crossmatch
  - Definitely no El
- Patients with antibodies or special requirements
  - Had an excel spreadsheet previously gathered from Telepath (although 3 months since last gather)
  - Users asked to put special requirements on request form



#### Labelling components / products

- Had a back-up printing system for multiple labels for same patient Or
- Handwritten, single labels
- Photocopies taken of all bags reserved and retained with the request form



### Stock management

- Records of new stock received
  - Manually checked delivery notes
  - EDN barcodes retained
- Batched products
  - Records of what has been received
- Expired or wasted units
  - Kept quarantined or photocopied



# Problems

- Ran out of ink cartridges and toner very quickly
- Workload over ordering to compensate for time delays
- National Transfusion Committee Guideline for triage of red cell transfusion:
  - Every single patient going to theatre was crossmatched for at least 2 units.
  - Blood stocks depleted rapidly



### What went well

- Raised the profile of Transfusion in the Trust
  - Transfusion Senior lab staff were summoned daily to Trust's silver command meeting
  - The Chief Exec. told other managers that Blood Bank was his number one priority

#### BBTS

- Occurred during BBTS conference in Harrogate
- Harrogate District Hospital agreed to test all LTHT Ante-Natal samples



### What went well - staff

- Staff togetherness / empowerment
  - Effort over and above working long shifts
  - Blood Bank staff encouraged to produce documents to use
    - If a document or template was needed
      - Produce it and send it to document managers for entry into our QMS
  - Trust IT and Pathology IT staff worked together to resolve the problem



# The end in sight?

- On Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> September, Blood Transfusion database was rebuilt (completed 16:30)
- Validation took 8 hours
- Full use from 02:30 Saturday
- Blood Transfusion lost 36 hours of data
- Worked backwards from BloodTrack to update Telepath for the missing 36 hours



# The end in sight?

- We used photocopies of the components to retrospectively update Telepath
- We did not enter the G&S results into Telepath, unless components had been reserved (too numerous)
- We entered a comment to explain that El was not available on these samples
- Took approx. 3 weeks to fully update and check that all components were accounted for
- Operated 72 hour rule until update complete



#### Errors

- > 29 Errors, 23 potentially avoidable
  - 12 special requirements not met (irradiated and/or HEV Neg, or phenotyped matched)
  - 8 crossmatching errors post return of Telepath
  - 4 patients with historic antibodies (2x anti-K, 2x anti-C), no longer detectable received blood - all units were antigen negative by chance
  - 2 labelling errors detected
  - 1 testing error (abbreviated group only performed)
  - 1 unit transfused on expired sample (>72 hours old)
  - 1 wrong group transfused (A Pos to A Neg male), error in transcription of results



### Summary

- Risk assess the loss of your IT systems
- Ensure good processes in IT department
  - Maintenance
  - Back-up
- Have a good disaster recovery plan
- Have a robust manual back-up system
  - Cope with short or long downtimes
  - Test to see if it works
- When IT fails involve clinicians in decision making
  - Who to test
  - Who to transfuse



### Acknowledgements

- BBTS HoT SIG and BBT SIG
- Alex Liversidge (LTHT Training coordinator)
- Gayle Sugden (Lab Manager, Blood Transfusion Dept. Harrogate Hospitals)
- LTHT Blood Transfusion staff

